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COMMENTS
IMPOSITION OF LIABILITY ON SOCIAL
HOSTS IN DRUNK DRIVING CASES: A
JUDICIAL RESPONSE MANDATED BY
PRINCIPLES OF COMMON LAW
AND COMMON SENSE
I. INTRODUCTION
During the past few years "the courts joined the legisla-
tures in earnest in the 5-year old crackdown on drunken driv-
ing."' Indeed, the crisis on the nation's highways resulting
from the dangerous mix of alcohol and driving has given rise
to various responses by the courts. In June 1984, the United
States Supreme Court unanimously held that the police need
not preserve for the defense a sample of a suspect's breath.2 A
growing number of jurisdictions are holding civil drunken-
driving defendants liable for punitive as well as compensatory
damages.3 Some courts have held bartenders vicariously lia-
ble for accidents caused by drunken customers, even in the
absence of state "dram shop" laws.4
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not ignored this trend.
In 1984, the court reversed years of precedent to impose liabil-
ity on bartenders for serving minors who become intoxicated
and cause injury.5 Less than a year later, the court extended
liability to the next logical degree by recognizing a negligence
cause of action against social hosts who furnish alcoholic bev-
erages to minors.6
The New Jersey Supreme Court went even further, in fact
further than any other state high court, by extending liability
1. Flaherty, The Year in Law-Drunken Driving, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 31, 1984-Jan.
7, 1985, at 22, col. 1.
2. California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528 (1984).
3. See, e.g., Taylor v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 890, 598 P.2d 854, 157 Cal. Rptr.
693 (1979).
4. See, eg., Puglia v. Drinks on the Beach, Inc., 457 So. 2d 519 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1984).
5. Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984).
6. Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985).
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to social hosts for injuries resulting from the negligent driving
of their intoxicated adult guests. 7  Although no other court
has followed New Jersey's lead,8 a number of courts, in addi-
tion to Wisconsin, have imposed vicarious liability on social
hosts for third-party injuries resulting from alcohol-related
automobile accidents involving their minor guests. 9
Social host liability1° is considered an extension of the vi-
carious civil liability imposed on tavernkeepers for injuries
arising out of negligent acts of their intoxicated customers.1
To extend liability to tavernkeepers, courts have relied on es-
sentially two theories: liability based on state dram shop
acts 2 and liability based on negligence per se for violations of
state liquor control laws. 13 Those courts that have extended
liability to social hosts in drunk-driving cases similarly rely on
state dram shop acts14 and the theory of negligence per se.' 5
7. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
8. Despite the lack of case law precedent for the Kelly decision on social host liabil-
ity, Oregon and New Mexico have statutes which appear to codify the same rule. See
OR. REv. STAT. § 30.955 (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-11-1(E) (1978 & Supp. 1985);
see also infra notes 71-74 & 97 and accompanying text.
9. Burke v. Superior Court, 129 Cal. App. 3d 570, 181 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1982); Brat-
tain v. Herron, 159 Ind. App. 663, 309 N.E.2d 150 (1974); Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich.
App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973). See, e.g., Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa.
157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983). In addition, the California Court of Appeals has recognized
a common-law action against a social host who has served intoxicants to an individual
under a special disability. See Cantor v. Anderson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 124, 178 Cal.
Rptr. 540 (1981).
10. The phrase "social host liability" or similar terms will be used throughout this
Comment to refer, in an abbreviated manner, to the rule that a host who serves liquor to
a social guest, knowing that the guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be operating a
motor vehicle, is civilly liable in damages for injuries inflicted on a third party as a
result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the guest when such negligence is
caused by the guest's intoxication. Furthermore, unless otherwise indicated, "social
host liability" will refer to liability imposed on a social host for serving a guest alcoholic
beverages, without regard for the character of the guest (adult, minor, or otherwise).
11. See Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. at -, 476 A.2d at 1222-24.
12. State dram shop acts typically provide a civil cause of action to persons injured
by an intoxicated person against the person selling the liquor which caused the intoxica-
tion. See, e.g., Liquor Control Act § 6-21, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd
1985).
13. See, e.g., Ono v. Applegate, 62 Hawaii 131, 612 P.2d 533 (1980); Nesbitt v.
Westport Square, Ltd., 624 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Lopez v. Maez, 98 N.M.
625, 651 P.2d 1269 (1982).
14. See cases cited infra notes 24-46 and accompanying text.
15. See cases cited infra notes 55-69 and accompanying text.
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Extension of liability to social hosts has been justified by appli-
cation of principles of common-law negligence as well. '6
In Section II the theoretical underpinnings of social host
liability will be discussed. In Section III it will be asserted
that the principles of common-law negligence provide the
most appropriate theoretical framework on which to base im-
position of liability on social hosts for injuries of third-party
victims. Finally, in Section IV it will be argued that applica-
tion of Wisconsin common law principles of negligence points
clearly to the imposition of social host liability.
II. THEORETICAL BASES OF LIABILITY
The scope of this Comment is limited to the legal issues
arising out of the following typical fact situation: Guest is in-
vited to a gathering at Social Host's home. Guest comes to
the party and becomes intoxicated by the alcoholic beverages
served by Social Host. Guest drives away from the party in a
negligent manner and is involved in a collision in which Third
Party is injured. 17 Can Social Host be held liable for Third
16. See cases cited infra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
17. While it is true that not all cases involve automobile accidents, many do. Fur-
thermore, it is not always Third Party who seeks damages from Social Host; Guest can
seek recovery from Social Host for injuries sustained in an automobile accident on the
way home from Social Host's party. Except for issues of contributory negligence and
apportionment of responsibility for the injuries sustained by Guest, consideration of
social host liability is similar whether the plaintiff is a guest or a third party. However,
this Comment directly analyzes only the latter. For further discussion of considerations
peculiar to a plaintiff-guest, see Note, Commercial and Social Host Liabilityfor Dispens-
ing Alcoholic Beverages, 16 WILLAMETrE L.J. 191, 201, 204 (1979).
In fact, the issue of whether a social host is liable for injuries to a plaintiff-guest
remains controversial despite recognition of a cause of action against social hosts by
third-party plaintiffs. In Michigan, for example, the courts have permitted a civil cause
of action against social hosts for negligent furnishing of alcohol to minor guests by
innocent third parties injured by the intoxicated minor. See, eg., Thaut v. Finley, 50
Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820, modJying, 47 Mich. App. 542, 209 N.W.2d 695
(1973); Lover v. Sampson, 44 Mich. App. 173, 205 N.W.2d 69 (1972). However, two
different panels of the Michigan Court of Appeals have arrived at different conclusions
respecting social host liability to their minor guests. In Longstreth v. Fitzgibbon, 125
Mich. App. 261, 335 N.W.2d 677 (1983), one panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals
held that a minor imbiber may maintain a claim against a social host for negligently
furnishing alcohol to him or her. However, a different panel of the same court dis-
agreed on this point in Klotz v. Persenaire, 138 Mich. App. 638, 360 N.W.2d 255
(1984).
Moreover, this Comment similarly does not address the considerations surrounding
the notion of attaching tort liability to an employer for providing intoxicants to a visibly
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Party's injury? If so, on what theoretical foundations does So-
cial Host's liability rest?
A. Liability Arising Out of State Dram Shop Acts
Common law traditionally afforded no civil remedies for
injuries caused by intoxication. 18 The common law rule is
based on a narrow conception of proximate cause: For an or-
dinary able-bodied person, it is the consumption of the alco-
hol, not the furnishing of it, which is the proximate cause of
any subsequent accident.' 9 With the exception of the jurisdic-
tions noted in this Comment, 20 all jurisdictions still adhere to
this common law rule of immunity in drunk-driving cases
with respect to social hosts.2 '
In order to provide a civil remedy where the common law
did not, many state legislatures enacted civil damages acts or
dram shop acts. These legislative acts affitrmatively create
civil liability against the seller or provider of alcoholic bever-
ages for injuries resulting from the imbiber's intoxication.22
Some jurisidictions which have enacted dram shop acts have
enacted acts which are facially broad enough to impose liabil-
ity on social hosts.23 A typical example is the Illinois dram
shop act: "Every person who is injured in person or property
intoxicated employee at an office party knowing that the employee must drive away.
Although California does not recognize a cause of action against social hosts, a Califor-
nia appellate court imposed liability on an employer where the employer furnished alco-
hol in connection with a "business purpose." See Harris v. Trojan Fireworks Co., 120
Cal. App. 3d 157, 163-64, 174 Cal. Rptr. 452, 456 (1981). The same rationale has been
employed by a North Carolina appellate court in Freeman v. Finney, 65 N.C. App. 526,
-, 309 S.E.2d 531, 535 (1983), review denied, 310 N.C. 744, 315 S.E.2d 702 (1984).
On employer liability, see also Halligan v. Pupo, 37 Wash. App. 84, 678 P.2d 1295
(1984).
18. See generally 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 553 (1969).
19. Id. See also Stanage v. Bilbo, 382 So. 2d 423 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
20. See infra note 44 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 527 (W.D.N.C. 1981),
vacated on other grounds, 694 F.2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1106
(1983); Cady v. Coleman, 315 N.W.2d 593 (Minn. 1982); Hamm v. Carson City Nug-
get, Inc., 85 Nev. 99, 450 P.2d 358 (1969); Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d
507 (1983).
22. For a list of state dram shop acts, see 12 AM. JUR. TRIALS Dram Shop Litiga-
tion § 2 (1966). It should be noted that Wisconsin's dram shop act, Wis. STAT.
§ 176.35 (1979-80) was deemed unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court in
Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971), and subsequently deleted by 1981
Wis. Laws 79.
23. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
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by any intoxicated person, has a right of action in his or her
own name, severally or jointly, against any person who by
selling or giving alcoholic liquor, causes the intoxication of
such person." 24 Surprisingly, such a broadly drafted dram
shop act does not give rise to social host liability. The law is
consistently construed narrowly to exclude the social host.25
Consider also New York's controlling dram shop act. Like
the Illinois statute, the New York dram shop act incorporates
broad language.26 New York courts have uniformly excluded
social hosts from the scope of the dram shop act even though
the act refers to persons who "give away" alcohol.27 One New
York court set forth the following dubious explanation for the
act's limited application: "Although the words 'give away'
are included, the plain purpose of this statutory language was
to include within the ambit of the sanctions those instances
24. Liquor Control Act § 6-21, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 135 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1984-85).
25. In Illinois, a series of decisions consistently refused to enlarge, by judicial inter-
pretation, the scope of the state dram shop act. One Illinois appellate court stated:
[T]he Dram Shop Act was intended to regulate the business of selling, distribut-
ing, manufacturing and wholesaling alcoholic liquors for profit. In other words,
it was to regulate those in the business, not the social drinker or the social drink-
ing of a group..... We interpret the word "giving" as applicable only to one
engaged in the liquor business.
Miller v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 48 Ill. App. 2d 412, 423, 199 N.E.2d 300, 306,
(1964). See also Fabian v. Polish Am. Veterans Ass'n, 126 Ill. App. 3d 80, 466 N.E.2d
1239 (1984); Heldt v. Brei, 118 Ill. App. 3d 798, 455 N.E.2d 842 (1983).
26. The New York dram shop act appears at N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 11-101
(McKinney 1978). This dram shop act authorizes recovery for injuries caused by an
intoxicated person from "any person" who unlawfully contributed to the intoxication.
Unlawful contribution has been interpreted to mean a "prohibited sale" as that term is
defined by N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CoNT. LAW § 65 (McKinney 1970). See Huyler v. Rose,
88 A.D.2d 755,_, 451 N.Y.S.2d 478,479 (1982); Gabrielle v. Craft, 75 A.D.2d 939,
,428 N.Y.S.2d 84, 87 (1980).
27. A "prohibited sale" pursuant to the New York alcoholic beverage statute has
consistently been interpreted not to arise out of the non-commercial setting involving a
social host. See, eg., Huyler v. Rose, 88 A.D.2d 755, -, 451 N.Y.S.2d 478, 479 (1982);
Kohler v. Wray, 114 Misc. 2d 856, 452 N.Y.S.2d 831 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982); Edgar v.
Kajet, 84 Misc. 2d 100, 375 N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975), affid, 55 A.D.2d 597,
389 N.Y.S.2d 631 (1976). Social hosts are excluded from application of this statute
despite its language which provides that no person shall sell, deliver or "give away"
alcohol to certain persons. N.Y. ALco. BEy. CoNT. LAW § 65 (McKinney 1970) (em-
phasis supplied).
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where the proprietor of a licensed establishment. . . provides
the customer with the traditional 'drink on the house.' "28
Until 1980, Minnesota had a similarly broad-scoped dram
shop act which ostensibly imposed civil liability on social
hosts as well as commercial providers of alcohol.2 9 The Min-
nesota Supreme Court applied the act at face value and per-
mitted extension of liability to social hosts as well as to
commercial vendors in the case of Ross v. Ross.30 Based on an
examination of the statutory language, the court concluded
that "the legislature intended to create a new cause of action
against every violator whether in the liquor business or not."3
The Ross court apparently arrived at an erroneous conclu-
sion about legislative intent. Shortly after the Ross decision
was issued, the Minnesota legislature limited the language of
the state dram shop act. A simple legislative deletion of the
word "giving" resulted in both a dram shop act which clearly
applies only to the seller of intoxicants and an affirmative dis-
approval of the Ross decision.32
Considering the type of treatment afforded to broadly
drafted dram shop acts by the courts and legislatures, it is not
surprising that more narrowly drafted dram shop acts are
strictly construed to impose civil liability only on liquor ven-
28. Kohler v. Wray, 114 Misc. 2d at , 452 N.Y.S.2d at 833 (quoting Gabrielle v.
Craft, 75 A.D.2d 939, 940, 428 N.Y.S.2d 84, 87 (1980)).
29. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West 1972).
30. 294 Minn. 115, 200 N.W.2d 149 (1972).
31. Id. at 121, 200 N.W.2d at 152-53 (construing MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95
(West 1972)):
Every husband, wife, child, parent, guardian, employer, or other person who is
injured in person or property, or means of support, by any intoxicated person, or
by intoxication of any person, has a right of action, in his own name, against any
person who, by illegally selling, bartering, or giving intoxicated liquors caused
the intoxication of such person, for all damages sustained, and all damages re-
covered by a minor under this section shall be paid either to such minor or to his
parent, guardian, or next friend, as the court directs, and all suits for damages
under this section shall be by civil action in any court of this state having juris-
diction thereof.
32. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1985). A similiar legislative reac-
tion occurred in Iowa. In Williams v. Klemesrud, 197 N.W.2d 614, 615 (Iowa 1972),
the Iowa Supreme Court recognized a claim against a non-commercial provider of alco-
hol based on Iowa's broad-formed dram shop act. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 129.2 (West
1949). The Iowa legislature subsequently repealed the broad-formed dram shop act in
1972 and created in its place an act which limits dram shop recovery to instances in-
volving the sale or giving of alcohol by "licensees or permittees." IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 123.92 (West Supp. 1984-85).
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dors and not on social hosts.33 In narrowly drafted dram shop
acts, where the legislature imposes liability only on liquor ven-
dors, legislative intent is to maintain the common law social
host immunity and preempt judicial interpretation on the is-
sue.34 Chief Justice Wilentz, writing for the majority in Kelly
v. Gwinnell,35 admitted that the existence of a dram shop act,
which by its very terms excludes the gratuitous provider of
alcohol, "constitutes a substantial argument against expansion
of the legislatively-mandated liability."
36
Legislative preemption is perhaps the justification most
frequently cited by the courts for refusing to extend liability to
social hosts.37 Other courts defer to their respective legisla-
tures in another way. The argument is often asserted, by
courts unwilling to extend liability to social hosts, that such a
fundamental change in the law is best left to the legislature.38
In Holmes v. Circo,39 the Nebraska Supreme Court explained
the underlying reasons for this type of legislative deference:
We agree. . that, in the final analysis, the controlling con-
siderations are public policy and whether the court or the
Legislature should declare it. We believe that the decision
should be left to the Legislature. The Legislature may hold
hearings, debate the relevant policy considerations, weigh
the testimony, and, in the event it determines a change in the
law is necessary or desirable, it can then draft statutes which
33. See, e-g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.92 (West Supp. 1984-85). No court in a state
which has a restrictive dram shop act has extended such an act to apply to social hosts
without legislative interference. See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
34. Legislative preemption was the rationale employed by the following decisions in
refusing to impose liability on a social host when a narrowly drafted dram shop act was
in effect. Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981); Cole v. City of
Spring Lake Park, 314 N.W.2d 836 (Minn. 1982).
35. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
36. Id. at 1227.
37. See cases cited infra note 38. Chief Justice Wilentz, who wrote the majority
opinion in Kelly, recognized the pervasiveness of the preemption argument in those
decisions which denied social host liability. See Kelly, 96 N.J. at _ 476 A.2d at 1227
(citing Cartwright v. Hyatt Corp., 460 F. Supp 80, 82 (D.D.C. 1978)). See also Runge
v. Watts, 180 Mont. 91, 589 P.2d 145 (1979); Klein v. Raysinger, 504 Pa. 141, 470 A.2d
507 (1983); Manning v. Andy, 454 Pa. 237, 310 A.2d 75 (1973); Halvorson v. Birchfield
Boiler, Inc., 76 Wash. 2d 759, 458 P.2d 897 (1969).
38. See, e.g., Lowe v. Rubin, 980 Ill. App. 3d 496, _, 424 N.E.2d 710, 712 (1981)
(citing Miller v. Moran, 96 Ill. App. 3d 596, 421 N.E.2d 1046 (1981)); accord Olsen v.
Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 492, 280 N.W.2d 178, 182 (1979) (commenting on proper
legislative perogative to extend liability).
39. 196 Neb. 496, 244 N.W.2d 65 (1976).
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would most adequately meet the needs of the public in gen-
eral, while balancing the interest of specific sectors.4
The Nebraska high court's statement is a typical example
of judicial deference to legislative bodies on particularly con-
troversial public policy issues. The courts, however, are not
required to refrain from addressing and resolving thorny pub-
lic policy issues.41 The courts, as well as the legislature, are
qualified to create dram shop liability.4 2 Each law-making
body, however, should utilize the law-making theories appro-
priate to their institution. Historically, the treatment of social
host liability based on extension or overbroad interpretation of
state dram shop acts has been unfavorable. This indicates that
dram shop acts do not provide the appropriate theoretical ba-
ses on which to judicially impose social host liability.
B. Liability Arising Out of Negligence Per Se
There are other, more appropriate means of establishing
social host liability if dram shop legislation does not. Some
jurisdictions, at least with respect to minors, have established
vicarious social host liability arising out of liquor control stat-
utes.43 All states and the District of Columbia have enacted
liquor control statutes' which regulate the distribution of al-
40. Id. at 505, 244 N.W.2d at 70.
41. In Wisconsin, for example, the supreme court has decided many significant is-
sues without prior legislative study. See, e.g., Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d
166, 342 N.W.2d 37 (1984) (adoption of a theory of "risk contribution liability" to
permit DES daughters to recover for injuries without identifying the particular pro-
ducer or marketer responsible for her injuries); Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis.
2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983) (adoption of the "discovery" rule). As the Kelly major-
ity noted, if the legislature differs, it can "remedy" the situation by promulgating its
own law. See Kelly, 96 N.J. at -, 476 A.2d at 1227-28. See also cases cited supra notes
34-36 and accompanying text.
42. Indeed, many courts have already judicially created dram shop liability. See
cases cited supra note 4. The recent decisions of Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366
N.W.2d 857 (1985); Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984), indi-
cate on the part of the Wisconsin Supreme Court its ability and authority to promulgate
rules of liquor liability.
43. These statutes are variously referred to as "liquor control statutes", "alcoholic
beverage control acts", and "intoxicating liquor acts." For ease of discussion, this
Comment will refer to these acts as "liquor control statutes" which give rise to criminal
liability upon violation. Liquor control statutes are to be distinguished from dram shop
acts which give rise to civil liability upon violation.
44. ALA. CODE § 28-3A (Supp 1985); ALASKA STAT. § 04.16 (1984); ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 4-241, 4-244 (Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 48-529 (1977); CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 25602, 25658 (West 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-128
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cohol to high risk persons, typically "minors"4 or "obviously
intoxicated persons. ' 46  Violation of these laws is usually
treated as a criminal misdemeanor offense.47 However, under
certain circumstances, violation of a criminal statute gives rise
to a civil action predicated on the theory of negligence per se.
The theory of negligence per se arises out of the notion
that for purposes of civil liability, a reasonable person stan-
dard of conduct may be prescribed by legislative enactment.
"When a statute provides that under certain circumstances
particular acts shall or shall not be done, it may be interpreted
as fixing a standard for all members of the community, from
which it is negligence to deviate. '48
(Supp. 1984); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-86 (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 4, § 713 (Supp. 1984); D.C. CODE ANN. § 25-121 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 562.11, 562.50 (West Supp. 1985); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-3-22, 3-3-23 (Supp. 1985);
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 281-78 (1976); IDAHO CODE §§ 23-312, 23-929 (1971); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 43, § 131 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985); IND. CODE §§ 7.1-5-7-8, 7.1-5-10-
14 (1984); IOWA CODE ANN. § 123.49 (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-2615
(1981); Ky. REv. STAT. § 244.080 (Supp. 1984); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:91 (West
1974) & § 26:88(1) (West 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 303, 1058 (West
Supp. 1985); MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 118 (Supp. 1985); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
138, § 34 (West Supp. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 436.29 (West 1978) &
§ 436.33 (Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.73 (West Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 67-1-81, 67-1-83 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.310 (Vernon Supp.
1985); MONT. CODES ANN. § 16-3-301 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-180 (1984); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 202.055 (1979); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 175.6 (Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT.
ANN. §§ 33.1-77, 33.1-39 (West Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-7A-16, 60-7B-1.1
(1981); N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 65 (McKinney 1970 & Supp. 1984-85); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 18B-305 (1983); N.D. CENT. CODE § 5-01-09 (1975); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 4301.69 (1982), 4301.22 (Page Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 537
(West Supp. 1984-85); OR. REv. STAT. § 471.315 (1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 4-
493 (Purdon 1969 & Supp. 1985); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-8-1 & § 3-8-6 (Supp. 1984); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 61-3-990 (Law Co-op Supp. 1984); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-4-78
(1977); TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-4-203 (Supp. 1985); TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. tit.
4, §§ 101.83, 106.03 (Vernon 1978); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 32-7-14, 32-7-15 (1953); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 658 (Supp. 1984); VA. CODE § 4-62 (Supp. 1985); WASH. REv.
CODE ANN. §§ 66.44.200, 66.44.270 (1985); W. VA. CODE § 60-3-22 (1984); Wis.
STAT. § 125.07 (1983-84); Wyo. STAT. § 12-6-101 (1981).
45. All states prohibit the sale and giving of alcoholic beverages to minors, but the
age of majority differs among jurisdictions. Reference throughout this Comment to
"minors" means under the legal drinking age, whatever that age may be.
46. Most states prohibit the sale and giving of alcoholic beverages to "intoxicated
persons," "habitual drunkards," or "obviously intoxicated" persons. This Comment
will refer to this group collectively as "obviously intoxicated persons."
47. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 125.07 (1983-84).
48. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 36, at 220 (5th ed. 1984).
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Certain conditions must be demonstrated before the the-
ory of negligence per se warrants the gleaning of a tort duty
from a legislative enactment:
The court may adopt as the standard of conduct of a reason-
able man the requirements of a legislative enactment or an
administrative regulation whose purpose is found to be ex-
clusively or in part (a) to protect a class of persons which
includes the one whose interest is invaded, and (b) to pro-
tect the particular interest which is invaded, and (c) to
protect that interest against the kind of harm which has re-
sulted, and (d) to protect that interest against the particu-
lar hazard from which the harm results.49
If, indeed, a statute meets the necessary conditions giving rise
to a duty under tort law, mere violation of the statute gives
rise to a breach under tort law.5
Since 1959, a number of state courts, relying on the theory
of negligence per se, have recognized a cause of action against
tavernkeepers for injuries caused by intoxicated customers
served in violation of state liquor control statutes.5 1 In the
landmark decision of Rappaport v. Nichols, 52 the New Jersey
Supreme Court imposed liability on a tavernkeeper for injuries
to a third party resulting from service of alcoholic beverages
by the tavernkeeper to a minor, in violation of New Jersey's
liquor control statute. The court reasoned that the basis for
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
50. See, e.g., Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 105, 41 N.W. 543, 544 (1889).
However, a social host can defend against civil liability under the theory of negli-
gence per se by availing itself of all the defenses provided by the pertinent criminal
statute. The availability of statutory defenses is discussed in Rappaport v. Nichols, 31
N.J. 188, -, 156 A.2d 1, 9 (1959). At common law there are additional defenses to a
claim of negligence per se:
[vliolation is excused when
(a) the violation is reasonable because of the actor's incapacity;
(b) he neither knows nor should know of the occasion for compliance;
(c) he is unable after reasonable diligence or care to comply;
(d) he is confronted by an emergency not due to his own misconduct;
(e) compliance would involve a greater risk of harm to the actor or to others.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 288A (1965).
51. Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959), was the first case to
recognize a cause of action against a tavernkeeper selling alcoholic beverages to a mi-
nor. A number of courts have followed the New Jersey lead on this rule. See, e.g.,
Thaut v. Finley, 50 Mich. App. 611, 213 N.W.2d 820 (1973); McClellan v. Tottenhoff,
666 P.2d 408 (Wyo. 1983).
52. 31 N.J. 188, 156 A.2d 1 (1959).
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finding a tort duty owed by the tavernowner to the third party
is "that these broadly expressed [statutory] restrictions were
not narrowly intended to benefit the minors and intoxicated
persons alone but were wisely intended for the protection of
members of the .general public as well."' 53 The same rationale
can be applied to argue that negligence per se is an appropri-
ate vehicle for extending liability to social hosts as well as to
tavernkeepers.
For the theory of negligence per se to give rise to social
host liability, as well as tavernkeeper liability, a number of
conditions must be met.54 First, it must be demonstrated that
the social host has violated the controlling liquor control stat-
ute. Second, it must be established that the controlling liquor
control statute was enacted by the legislature with intent to
protect a class of persons inclusive of third-party victims of
drunk-driving cases. Finally, it must be shown that the risk of
injuries to third-party victims is the same risk intended by the
legislature to be prevented by enactment of the liquor control
statute.
Indeed, a number of jurisdictions have applied the theory
of negligence per se in this way. Courts in these jurisdictions
have discerned an identity of purpose between the controlling
liquor control act and imposition of liability of social hosts
and have, therefore, imposed liability on social hosts.
Applying the theory of negligence per se, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court recognized a cause of action against social
hosts for serving minors.55 The court reasoned that violation
of the state liquor control statute violated a standard of care
set forth by the legislature. "What is negligence in most cases
presents a jury question. In liquor cases that involve minors
the statute supplies the standard of what is negligence, the
selling or furnishing of alcoholic beverages . ". .. , Consider
also the case of Congini v. Portersville Valve Co.57 In that case,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the governing
liquor control act regulating the service of alcoholic beverages
53. Id. at -, 156 A.2d at 8.
54. See supra note 49.
55. Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985).
56. Id. at 268, 366 N.W.2d at 861.
57. 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983).
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to minors protected "both minors and the public at large from
the perceived deleterious effects of serving alcohol to persons
under twenty-one years of age."'5 8
Negligence per se is not always an appropriate vehicle for
the extension of liability to social hosts. If the purposes of a
state's liquor control statute are not consistent with the pur-
poses of imposition of civil liability on a social host, negligence
per se is not the proper theoretical basis on which to base so-
cial host liability. In Linn v. Rand,59 the New Jersey Supreme
Court misapplied the theory of negligence per se to extend
civil liability to social hosts who served minors. The Linn
court applied the theory of negligence per se even though the
terms of the state's liquor control act prohibited solely "licen-
sees" from dispensing alcoholic beverages to minors. 60 There-
fore, under the controlling New Jersey liquor control act,
furnishing alcoholic beverages to minors by unlicensed social
hosts constitutes no statutory violation. Without demonstrat-
ing a statutory violation, the first condition for application of
the theory of negligence per se is not met. Without a viola-
tion, there is no deviation from a legislatively established stan-
dard of care.61 New Jersey's clear statutory language
regarding licensees cannot be ignored as it was by the Linn
court when it reasoned that "[it makes little sense to say that
the licensee in Rappaport is under a duty to exercise care, but
give immunity to a social host who may be guilty of the same
wrongful conduct merely because he is unlicensed. '62
The California Supreme Court similarly misinterpreted
legislative intent to extend liability to social hosts in drunk-
driving cases. In Coulter v. Superior Court,6 3 the California
Supreme Court held that Section 25602 of the Business and
Professional Code, which provided criminal misdemeanor
penalties for furnishing alcoholic beverages to an obviously in-
toxicated person, created a common-law duty owed by a so-
58. Id. at -, 470 A.2d at 518.
59. 140 N.J. Super. 212, 356 A.2d 15 (1976).
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 33:1-88 (West Supp. 1985).
61. As noted, the theory of negligence per se establishes a duty arising out of a
legislative enactment. Without a violation of the pertinent legislative enactment, there
is no violation of the resulting duty. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
62. Linn, 140 N.J. Super. at -, 356 A.2d at 18.
63. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
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cial host to a third party injured by an obviously intoxicated
guest. The court stated that its holding was consistent with
"broad legislative policies and may well further induce social
hosts to take those reasonable preventive measures calculated
to reduce the risk of alcohol-related accidents." 64
However, the legislature apparently did not agree that the
purposes of its liquor control act would properly be furthered
by extension of civil liability to social hosts. Shortly after the
Coulter decision, Section 25602 was amended expressly to ab-
rogate the Coulter holding.65 Thus, despite case law to the
contrary in California, legislative indications are clear that li-
quor control statutes are not intended to create a common-law
tort duty for social hosts.
In Wisconsin the state legislature recently reacted to judi-
cial creation of civil liability in drunk driving cases. In No-
64. Id. at 152, 577 P.2d at 673, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 538.
65. The California legislature amended the pertinent California statute such that
the consumption, and not the serving, of the alcohol was to be the proximate cause of
injuries inflicted on another by an intoxicated person. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 25602 (West Supp. 1985) as amended provides:
(a) Every person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished,
or given away, any alcoholic beverage to any habitual or common drunkard or to
any obviously intoxicated person is guilty of a misdemeanor.
(b) No person who sells, furnishes, gives, or causes to be sold, furnished, or
given away, any alcoholic beverage pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section
shall be civilly liable to any injured person or the estate of such person for inju-
ries inflicted on that person as a result of intoxication by the consumer of such
alcoholic beverage.
(c) The Legislature hereby declares that this section shall be interpreted so
that the holdings in cases such as Vesely v. Sager (5 Cal. 3d 153), Bernhard v.
Harrah's Club (16 Cal. 3d 313), and Coulter v. Superior Court (21 Cal. 3d 144),
be abrogated in favor of prior judicial interpretation finding the consumption of
alcoholic beverages rather than the serving of alcoholic beverages as the proxi-
mate cause of injuries inflicted upon another by an intoxicated person.
The constitutionality of the legislature's amendment was challenged and upheld in
Cory v. Shierloh, 29 Cal. 3d 430, 629 P.2d 8, 174 Cal Rptr. 500 (1981). The Cory
opinion provides a very interesting example of reluctant deference on the part of the
judiciary to legislative mandate. According to the court, it is only "[w]ith effort, [that] a
reasonable basis for the 1978 amendments may be found." Id. at 441, 629 P.2d at 14,
174 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
It should be noted that the California Supreme Court is unwilling to extend the
immunity promulgated by the legislature beyond its terms. In Blake v. Moore, 162 Cal.
App. 3d 700, 208 Cal. Rptr. 703 (1984), the California court refused to extend the Cory
holding and statutory authority immunizing a social host for liability for injuries arising
out of the host's furnishing of alcohol in a similar situation: negligent entrustment of an
automobile to an intoxicated person. See id. at -, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 706.
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vember 1985, a bill was passed to provide immunity for
persons who sell or give away alcoholic beverages.66 The new
legislation does not apply to persons who dispense alcohol to
minors. 6 7 The legislative response precludes extension of lia-
bility in drunk driving cases. The legislature appears to be
warning the court not to engage in further activism on the
issue.
The legislative responses in California and Wisconsin, and
the clear overreaching by the New Jersey court in Linn, indi-
cate that negligence per se is not always an appropriate theory
on which to base social host liability. Thus, while no one can
fault the underlying goals motivating courts to extend liability
to social hosts on the basis of negligence per se, reliance on an
assumption of legislative intent to accomplish this goal may be
unfounded.
The legal fiction of negligence per se need not be employed
to justify creation of a duty owed by a social host to the inno-
cent victims of their intoxicated guests. Such a duty rises out
of critical public policy considerations. Public policy consid-
erations bring to mind principles of common-law negligence.68
Indeed, as the discussion below will demonstrate, application
of common law negligence gives rise to a cause of action
against social hosts for third-party injuries apart from either
state dram shop acts or alcoholic beverage control laws.
C. Liability Arising out of Principles of Common Law
Negligence
The Oregon Supreme Court has recognized a cause of ac-
tion against social hosts in drunk driving cases based on prin-
ciples of common-law negligence. In Wiener v. Gamma Phi
Chapter of Alpha Tau Omega Fraternity,69 the Oregon court
66. 1985 Wis. Laws 47.
67. Id. at § 4.
68. Common law negligence requires a value judgment based on public policy anal-
ysis of whether an actor owes an injured party a duty of reasonable care. See Palsgraf v.
Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99, reh'g denied, 249 N.Y. 511, 164 N.E.
564 (1928); see also infra text accompanying notes 85-89.
69. 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971). This case involved an action for injuries alleg-
edly resulting from alcohol being served to a minor guest. The social setting was a
fraternity party held at a ranch about ten miles from a college campus. The injured
plaintiff sued the owners and operators of the ranch and the person who supplied the
alcohol to the party as well as the fraternity. The court held that the plaintiff validly
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declined to impose liability on a social host based on the
state's liquor control statute reasoning "that the design of
ORS 471.410(2) was to protect minors from the vice of drink-
ing alcoholic beverages; it was not the purpose of the statute
to protect third persons from injury resulting from the con-
duct of inebriated minors .... -70 However, as the court con-
tinued, under common-law tort principles "[tihere might be
circumstances in which the host would have a duty to deny
his guest further access to alcohol.171
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court extended liabil-
ity to social hosts on the basis of common-law negligence prin-
ciples.72 In Kelly v. Gwinnell,73 noting that New Jersey has no
dram shop act imposing civil liability on providers of alcohol,
the court nevertheless recognized a cause of action against so-
cial hosts on the basis of common-law negligence principles.
Indeed, the court stated that conventional negligence analysis
stated a claim only against the fraternity. With respect to the other defendants, it was
held that they lacked sufficient control over "direct dispensation of the alcohol at the
party." Id. at -, 485 P.2d at 22.
Imposing the duty of reasonable care on the fraternity, however, resulted in liability
according to the Oregon court. "The premises were rented to the fraternity, and the
fraternity gave the party; the fraternity, not the owners of the land, should bear the
responsibility for activities of guests who were negligently allowed to become intoxi-
cated." Id. The rule set forth by the court appears to apply regardless of the guest's
age. See id. at -, 485 P.2d at 21.
70. Wiener, 258 Or. at _, 485 P.2d at 21.
71. Id. A short epilogue to Wiener is in order. Eight years after the Oregon
Supreme Court's decision, the Oregon Legislature enacted OR. REv. STAT. § 30.955
(1981). This statutory provision limits a cause of action against a social host to provide
for damages only when the host "has served or provided alcoholic bevrages to a social
guest when such guest was visibly intoxicated." Thus, the legislature decided that the
circumstances under which a social host has a duty to deny a guest further alcohol are
when a guest is "visibly intoxicated." Cf Wiener, 258 Or. at -, 485 P.2d at 22.
72. Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984). In the Kelly case, an
adult guest, Donald Gwinnell, spent an hour or two at the home of Joseph Zak where
he was served multiple drinks of scotch and was subsequently accompanied to his car
and permitted to drive. The social host, Zak, telephoned Gwirmell's home about 25
minutes later to make sure Gwinnell had arrived home without incident. Mrs. Gwin-
nell answered and informed Zak that his guest had been involved in a head-on collision
with Marie Kelly, who, as a result, was seriously injured. Id. at , 476 A.2d at 1220.
Armed with the high court's ruling, Kelly went back to the trial court to recover
damages. Her attorney provided the court with evidence that Gwinnell had imbibed the
equivalent of 13 shots of scotch during his visit. Before any witnesses could testify on
behalf of Gwinnell, the insurance companies settled. Kelly received $172,000. Of the
total recovery, the host's insurer will pay $72,000. See Expensive Pour, TIME, Mar. 4,
1985, at 73.
73. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
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"points strongly" in the direction of social host liability.74
The Kelly court identified the usual elements of a cause of ac-
tion for negligence: "an action by defendant creating an un-
reasonable risk of harm to plaintiff, a risk that was clearly
foreseeable, and a risk that resulted in an injury equally
foreseeable. 75
The holdings of the Wiener and Kelly courts are not un-
warranted abrogations of the common-law immunity for so-
cial providers of alcoholic beverages. As it will be argued in
the next section, the application of common law to the type of
case at issue in this Comment clearly suggests extension of
liability to social hosts.
III. THE COMMON LAW FRAMEWORK
A. Proximate Cause
The common-law immunity for social hosts and other
providers of alcoholic beverages is based on the idea that it is
the consumption of the liquor, not the furnishing of it, that is
the proximate cause of any consequent injury.76 In Kelly v.
Gwinnell,77 the New Jersey Supreme Court did not recognize
the proximate cause element as an obstacle to social host lia-
bility. The court merely assumed the presence of the requisite
degree of causation between a social host's furnishing of alco-
holic beverages and injuries subsequently caused by the intoxi-
cated guest's drunk driving.78
Thus, to impose liability on social hosts in drunk driving
cases, a determination must be made that the furnishing of
alcohol sufficiently constitutes a proximate cause of subse-
quent injuries. Jurisdictions that have abrogated the com-
mon-law immunity afforded tavernkeepers and social hosts
serving minors apparently no longer consider proximate cause
74. Id. at -, 476 A.2d at 1221.
75. Id. at -, 476 A.2d at 1222.
76. See supra notes 18 & 19 and accompanying text.
77. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
78. Id. at -, 476 A.2d at 1222. The court simply stated that "[t]he usual elements
of a cause of action for negligence are clearly present .. " Id. Included among these
clearly present usual elements is that "a risk resulted in an injury ... " Id. (emphasis
supplied).
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a legitimate obstacle to the imposition of liability.79 Indeed, it
makes little sense to deny a proximate cause relationship be-
tween the social host's service of alcoholic beverages to an
adult guest but to declare its existence when the guest is a
minor or when the provider is a tavernkeeper.80 In fact, the
reasoning employed by most courts in refusing to extend lia-
bility to social hosts is that public policy and legislative pre-
emption,81 not proximate cause considerations, warrant their
decisions.
B. Public Policy
In the absence of proximate cause considerations, the
question of whether or not to extend liability to social hosts
boils down to a question of public policy. Most courts employ
public policy analysis as a preliminary matter to determine
whether or not a duty of care exists.82 In these jurisdictions,
determining whether a duty exists is in essence a "value judg-
ment, based on an analysis of public policy, that the actor
owed the injured party a duty of reasonable care." 83
With respect to the imposition of liability on social hosts,
the New Jersey Supreme Court opined that "imposition of a
duty is both consistent with and supportive of a social goal-
the reduction of drunken driving-that is practically unani-
mously accepted by society."' 84 In a society where thousands
of deaths and millions of dollars of property damage are
79. See, eg., Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985) (liability
imposed on social host for negligently furnishing alcohol to minor); Sorensen v. Jarvis,
119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984) (liability imposed on a commercial vendor of
liquor for illegally furnishing alcohol to a minor); Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504
Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983) (liability imposed on a social host for illegally furnishing
alcohol to a minor).
80. When discussing social host liability, alleging a dispositive difference with re-
spect to proximate cause is the kind of "straw-man argument" Chief Justice Hallows
refers to in his dissent in Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 739, 176 N.W.2d 566, 573
(1970) (Hallows, J., dissenting).
81. For a discussion of legislative preemption see supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
82. The famous case of Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99
(1928), established the notion that the court determines, as a threshold question,
whether public policy warrants recognition of a cause of action in negligence. Id. at -,
162 N.E. at 101. Accord Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J. 538, _ 476 A.2d 1219, 1222
(1984).
83. Id. at -, 476 A.2d at 1222.
84. Id.
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caused each year by drunken driving,85 and where criminal
sanctions against drunken driving are being significantly
strengthened nationwide,8 6 imposition of a duty of reasonable
care on social hosts is consistent with prevailing public policy
considerations.
C. Flexibility
Although public policy factors mandate the extension of
liability to social hosts in drunk-driving cases,87 public policy
factors do not mandate imposition of such liability on the ba-
sis of common-law negligence. Social host liability in drunk
driving cases has been predicated on state dram shop acts and
the theory of negligence per se, as well as common-law princi-
ples of negligence. Common law, however, is the most appro-
priate theory on which to base social host liability because it
provides for flexibility.
If social host liability is predicated on a state dram shop
act or the theory of negligence per se, a social host may be
held civilly liable for even a technical statutory violation.88
On the other hand, social host liability predicated on a theory
of common-law negligence renders a social host liable only for
a breach of a duty of reasonable care.
A duty of reasonable care at common law is flexible. It
simply requires a social host to act reasonably under the cir-
cumstances. By requiring only what is reasonable under the
circumstances, the social host duty is not under a more oner-
ous burden than the similar common-law duty imposed on
tavernkeepers in a number of jurisdictions.89
85. See DeMoulin & Whitcomb, Social Host's Liability in Furnishing Alcoholic Bev-
erages, 27 FED'N INS. COUNS. Q. 349 (1977); see also Kelly, 96 N.J. at -, 476 A.2d at
1222, n.3.
86. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 940.25 (1983-84) (imposes criminal liability for injuries
caused while driving under the influence of alcohol). The legislature itself indicated
that it intended, by passage of this statute, and other stiff criminal statutory penalties for
drunk driving, "to provide penalties sufficient to deter the operation of motor vehicles
by persons who are intoxicated." 1981 Wis. Laws 20, § 2051(13)(b).
87. See supra text accompanying notes 80-84.
88. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
89. Beginning with Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, -, 156 A.2d 1, 8 (1959),
service by a tavernkeeper of obviously intoxicated patrons has been recognized by some
courts as conduct not reasonably prudent under the circumstances. Thus, a
tavernkeeper's duty is to prevent obviously intoxicated persons from drinking more and
driving away.
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While a social host may lack the tavernkeeper's expertise
and knowledge for detection of intoxication, common-law
negligence imposes a duty on social hosts merely to prevent
the obviously intoxicated or minor guest from driving home.90
Imposing liability based on common law does not compel a
social host to police his guests. 91 The ordinary standard of
reasonable care simply requires a social host to use reasonable
care to prevent a guest from driving in an intoxicated condi-
tion. Arguably, a host has greater means to accomplish this
objective than does a commercial liquor vendor. Like a ven-
dor, a host can refuse service to a guest, although this is not a
very attractive alternative for a hospitable host. The social
host, however, has other options. For example, a social host
may satisfy a reasonable standard of care by suggesting that
an intoxicated guest spend the night or by arranging to have a
sober guest accompany an intoxicated guest home. Again, by
imposing the common-law negligence standard of reasonable
care, a social host is not required to do any more than that
which is reasonable under the circumstances.
The foregoing discussion attempts to demonstrate the via-
bility and desirability of imposition of social host liability
based on principles of common-law negligence. Only four
states have extended liability to social hosts for negligent ser-
90. Justice Garibaldii, dissenting from the Kelly opinion, argues that a social host,
lacking a tavernkeeper's expertise, cannot easily detect intoxication. See Kelly, 96 N.J.
at _ 476 A.2d at 1233-34 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). By way of rebuttal, it must be
emphasized that a social host, under principles of common-law negligence, is only liable
for failing to exercise reasonable care, given all the facts and circumstances, to prevent
an intoxicated person from drinking and then driving. If the circumstances do not per-
mit the social host to determine whether or not the guest is intoxicated, service of alco-
holic beverages by the social host is not a breach of a duty of reasonable care.
91. Although the duty of reasonable care does not compel policing of guests, cer-
tainly one way of meeting the standard of care imposed on social hosts by application of
common-law negligence principles is to police guests. The Kelly majority rationalized
this unappealing idea as follows:
While we recognize the concern that our ruling will interfere with accepted stan-
dards of social behavior; will intrude on and somewhat diminish the enjoyment,
relaxation, and camaraderie that accompany social gatherings at which the alco-
hol is served . . . we believe that the added assurance of just compensation to
the victims of drunken driving as well as the added deterrent effect of the rule on
such driving outweigh the importance of those other values.
Id. at ., 476 A.2d at 1224.
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vice of alcoholic beverages to adult guests. 9z It will be seen in
the following section that similar liability could have, and
should have, been imposed by the Wisconsin courts on the
basis of Wisconsin negligence law.93
IV. WISCONSIN COMMON-LAW NEGLIGENCE PRINCIPLES
AND SOCIAL HOST LIABILITY
Wisconsin common-law negligence precepts are particu-
larly well suited to justify extension of liability to social hosts.
First, the cause element of common-law negligence is no
longer predicated on the concept of proximate causation, but
on the concept of substantial factor.94 Second, in the absence
of proximate cause problems, the controlling consideration of
Wisconsin common-law negligence is public policy. 95 Apply-
92. Indiana: Ashlock v. Norris, - Ind. App. _, 475 N.E.2d 1167 (1985); Iowa:
Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226 (Iowa 1985); New Jersey: Kelly v. Gwinnell, 96 N.J.
538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984); Oregon: Wiener v. Gamma Phi Chapter of Alpha Tau
Omega Fraternity, 258 Or. 632, 485 P.2d 18 (1971). In addition to these four states,
New Mexico may be a social host liability jurisdiction. Although there is no interpre-
tive case law yet, New Mexico recently enacted a statute which appears to impose civil
liability on social hosts. See N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-11-1 1(E) (Supp. 1985).
Only the New Jersey and Oregon case rules are based on common law. The Indiana
and Iowa rulings are interpretations of state statutes governing the dispensation of li-
quor to intoxicated persons.
Wisconsin has recognized social host liability in cases involving minor guests. See
Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857 (1985). For a list of additional
cases in which a cause of action against a social host has been recognized when the
social host served intoxicants to a minor, see cases cited supra note 9.
93. The Wisconsin Supreme Court imposed liability on social hosts for serving mi-
nor guests in Koback, 123 Wis. 2d 259, 366 N.W.2d 857. This ruling was based on the
theory of negligence per se as a result of the court's interpretation of statutes regulating
the dispensation of alcohol to minors. Id. at 266-67, 366 N.W.2d at 860-61. However,
the court seemed to recognize that providing alcohol to minors could entail negligent
conduct not proscribed by the statutes. "In liquor cases that involve minors the statute
supplies the standard of what is negligence, the selling or furnishing of alcoholic bever-
ages - although there may be other acts of negligence that could also lead to liability.
Id. at 268, 366 N.W.2d at 861 (emphasis supplied).
The court did not explain what these other acts of actionable negligence might be.
This language does, however, indicate that the court recognized that common-law prin-
ciples of negligence, as well as negligence per se, can give rise to social host liability.
94. For a history of the Wisconsin high court's view of the cause element of a
negligence action, see A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214
N.W.2d 764 (1974); Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, Inc., 262 Wis. 229, 55
N.W.2d 29 (1952); Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
95. Public policy analysis controls Wisconsin negligence law because it constitutes
the basis for the court's ultimate determination of liability. "If the jury does determine
that there was negligence, and that such negligence was a substantial factor in produc-
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ing factors identified by the Wisconsin Supreme Court as in-
dicative of public policy, imposition of social host liability is
warranted.
A. Proximate Cause v. Substantial Factor
Beginning with the landmark case of Osborne v. Montgom-
ery,96 the Wisconsin Supreme Court has consistently con-
cluded that the negligence cause element is not grounded in
the narrow concept of proximate cause, but in the broad no-
tion of substantial factor. In other words, foreseeability has
been completely removed from the concept of causation.97
The common-law immunity afforded social host and com-
mercial providers of alcoholic beverages was based on the no-
tion of proximate cause.98 The Wisconsin Supreme Court
recognized the fatal flaw in the common-law immunity ration-
ale in Garcia v. Hargrove.99  The court concluded that
"although cases still follow the rule of non-liability, they are
of little persuasion in this state when predicated on the 'proxi-
mate cause' of plaintiff's injuries being the consumption and
not the sale of intoxicants." 100 In cases subsequent to Garcia,
the supreme court has deemed proximate cause arguments
against imposing liability on the provider of alcoholic bever-
ages irrelevant. 10 1
Since Garcia, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has tacitly as-
sumed the presence of a substantial factor connection between
the provider of the alcoholic beverage and the resulting dam-
ages.10 2 Thus, the question of whether or not to extend liabil-
ing the injury, it is then for the court to decide as a matter of law whether or not
considerations of public policy require that there be no liability." Pfeifer, 262 Wis. at
240, 55 N.W.2d at 35.
96. 203 Wis. 223, 234 N.W. 372 (1931).
97. See A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders Inc., 62 Wis. 2d 479, 484, 214 N.W.2d
764, 766 (1974).
98. See Farmers Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Gast, 17 Wis. 2d 344, 117 N.W.2d 347
(1962); Seibel v. Leach, 233 Wis. 66, 288 N.W. 774 (1939); Demge v. Feierstein, 222
Wis. 199, 268 N.W. 210 (1936). All of the above cases were overruled by Sorensen v.
Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 350 N.W.2d 108 (1984).
99. 46 Wis. 2d 724, 176 N.W.2d 566 (1970).
100. Id. at 731, 176 N.W.2d at 569.
101. See, eg., Sorensen v. Jarvis, 119 Wis. 2d 627, 641, 350 N.W.2d 108, 115
(1984); Olsen v. Copeland, 90 Wis. 2d 483, 486, 280 N.W.2d 178, 179 (1979).
102. Beginning with Garcia, the supreme court has ignored analysis of the cause
element and addressed, instead, questions of public policy in cases respecting extension
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ity to commercial providers of alcoholic beverages turned
wholly on issues of public policy. 10 3
B. Public Policy
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has identified certain pub-
lic policy factors to be applied in determining the ultimate
existence of a cause of action sounding in negligence. These
factors include whether:
(1) The injury is too remote from the negligence; or (2) the
injury is too wholly out of proportion to the culpability of
the negligent tort-feasor; or (3) in retrospect it appears too
highly extraordinary that the negligence should have
brought about the harm; or (4) because allowance of recov-
ery would place too unreasonable a burden on the negligent
tort-feasor; or (5) because allowance of recovery would be
too likely to open the way for fraudulent claims; or (6) al-
lowance of recovery would enter a field that has no sensible
or just stopping point."°
Application of several of these public policy factors fully sup-
ports a rule imposing civil liability on social hosts for injuries
caused by the drunk driving of their intoxicated guests.
1. Is the Injury Too Remote from the Negligence or, in
Retrospect, Is It Highly Extraordinary that the
Negligence Brought About the Harm?
As Justice Day reasoned in his dissenting opinion in Olsen
v. Copeland,0 5 "[t]o call remote the link between a fatal auto-
of liability in drunk-driving cases. This approach is unusual; Wisconsin negligence law
typically requires a prior jury determination as to whether or not a substantial factor
causation relationship exists between the alleged negligence and the plaintiff's injuries.
See Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 94 Wis. 2d 17, 51, 288 N.W.2d 95, 112 (1980). There
was no factual resolution by a jury on the substantial factor question in Garcia, Olsen or
Sorensen; each case was before the court subsequent to dismissal for failure to state a
claim. Nevertheless, the supreme court assumed a substantial factor relationship and
addressed public policy factors at the motion to dismiss stage. Cf Citizens State Bank
v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 387, 335 N.W.2d 361, 366 (1983) (holding
that determination of public policy questions should be made after a full factual explo-
ration takes place at trial).
103. Public policy considerations prohibited tavernkeeper liability in Garcia, 46
Wis. 2d at 736, 176 N.W.2d at 572 and in Olsen, 90 Wis. 2d at 488-94, 280 N.W.2d at
180-83. But see Sorensen, 119 Wis. 2d at 644, 350 N.W.2d at 118.
104. Sanem v. Home Ins. Co., 119 Wis. 2d 530, 539, 350 N.W.2d 89, 93 (1984)
(citations omitted).
105. 90 Wis. 2d 483, 280 N.W.2d 178 (1979).
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mobile accident and the serving of alcohol to an intoxicated
person is to ignore reality." 10 6 The reality is indeed frighten-
ing. In 1977, in Wisconsin alone, among 422 drivers killed in
automobile accidents who were also tested for blood alcohol
content, "221 of those drivers were legally intoxicated with
blood alcohol levels of .10 or above."107
Statistics indicate that when minors are the intoxicated
drivers resulting injuries are even more likely. Forty-two per-
cent of all fatal alcohol-related crashes involve sixteen to
twenty-four year olds, who make up only twenty percent of
licensed drivers.10 8 Traffic fatalities are the leading cause of
death among teenagers. 10 9 The current national movement to
raise the drinking age reflects awareness of this grim situa-
tion. 10 In light of these disturbing statistics, the frequently
asserted argument that injuries resulting from the furnishing
of alcohol are too remote, or the result too extraordinary, is
dubious, at best.
2. Is the Injury Wholly out of Proportion to the
Negligence?
An additional concern with respect to the imposition of
liability on social hosts is that it imposes a burden on
tortfeasors which is disproportionate to their negligence. This
problem is ameliorated by application of comparative negli-
gence principles. Under the modern theory of comparative
negligence,"' proportional negligence may be allocated to
joint tortfeasors. An innocent victim in Wisconsin, for exam-
ple, may recover against any tortfeasor, drunk-driver guest or
social host. Then, under theories of contribution, the joint
tortfeasors will allocate between themselves the loss in propor-
106. Id. at 497, 280 N.W.2d at 184 (Day, J., dissenting).
107. See id.
108. Make 21 the Nationwide Legal Age for Drinking, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Jan. 30, 1984, at 54.
109. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, PUB. No. (ADM) 78-286, NA-
TIONAL INSTITUTE ON ALCOHOL ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM (1978).
110. For a discussion of the current trend to raise the drinking age, see Florio,
Raise it to 21 and Find the Courage, 70 A.B.A. J., April 1984, at 18.
111. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 67 (5th ed.
1984).
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tion to the contribution of their fault.'"2 Thus, the proportion
of negligence can be reasonably tailored in comparative negli-
gence jurisdictions like Wisconsin.
3. Does Allowance of Recovery Place an Unreasonable
Burden on the Social Host Tortfeasor?
Recognizing a cause of action against social hosts does not
impose an unreasonable burden. Social hosts, like bartenders,
can purchase homeowner's insurance to protect themselves
and spread the risk of liability among other homeowners. The
standard homeowner policy does not exclude coverage for lia-
bility arising out of injuries caused by intoxicated guests. The
standard motor vehicle exclusion, for instance, only excludes
coverage for the "ownership, operation, maintenance or use,
including loading and unloading of the automobile."1 '1 3
4. Does Imposition of Social Host Liability Open a Field
of Liability that Has No Just or Sensible
Stopping Point?
It has been postulated that imposing liability based on
common law has no sensible stopping point. Considering the
serious problems caused by alcohol-related injuries, this is an
incorrect view. The current crises on the highways has not
been solved by the imposition of civil or criminal liability on
the vendors of alcohol alone. Social host liability is the logical
and reasonable extension of liability of commercial vendors
recognized in most jurisdictions.I"
Moreover, the extension of liability to social hosts in alco-
hol-related accident cases is certainly based on motivations as
112. In Wisconsin, joint tortfeasors allocate between themselves the damages in
proportion to the contribution of their fault. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d 1, 114
N.W.2d 105 (1962). A social host will only be liable for that proportion of the injury
determined to be its fault.
113. Bankert v. Threshmen's Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Wis. 2d 469, 329 N.W.2d 150
(1983). Cf. Cooperative Fire Ins. Co. v. Vondrak, 74 Misc. 2d 916, 346 N.Y.S.2d 965
(1973) (motor vehicle exclusionary clause in homeowner's policy did not preclude cov-
erage for damages sustained in automobile accident allegedly caused by insured's viola-
tion of state dram shop act).
114. See Keenan, Liquor Law Liability in California, 14 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 46,
51-52 (1974).
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compelling as the extension of liability to architects, 15 ac-
countants, 16 or estate planning lawyers' 17 for causing injuries
to third parties. Social host liability is similarly analogous to
the liability traditionally imposed on owners of vehicles who
lend their cars to persons they know to be intoxicated." 8
Thus, the public policy argument advanced by proponents
of the common-law immunity for social hosts is not convinc-
ing. The Wisconsin public policy reasons consistently argued
in support of not imposing liability despite a finding of negli-
gence causing injury, are all rebuttable with respect to social
host liability.
V. CONCLUSION
With Kelly v. Gwinnell,119 the New Jersey Supreme Court
established a convincing precedent for the imposition of liabil-
ity on social hosts in drunk-driving cases grounded on princi-
ples of common-law negligence. 120 The Kelly court declared
that:
a host who serves liquor to an adult social guest, knowing
both that the guest is intoxicated and will thereafter be oper-
ating a motor vehicle, is liable for injuries inflicted on a third
party as a result of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle
by the adult guest when such negligence is caused by the
intoxication.1 21
Unlike prior extensions of liability to social hosts for dam-
ages caused by their intoxicated minor guests, 122 or other dis-
115. See, e.g., A.E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, 62 Wis. 2d 479, 214 N.W.2d 764
(1974).
116. See, e.g., Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co., 113 Wis. 2d 376, 335
N.W.2d 361 (1983).
117. See, e.g., Auric v. Continental Casualty Co., 111 Wis. 2d 507, 331 N.W.2d 325
(1983).
118. It is negligence to permit a person to use an automobile which is under the
control of an actor, if the actor knows or should know that the person is likely to use the
thing in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk to others. See Bankert v.
Threshmen's Mut. Ins. Co., 110 Wis. 2d 469, 475-76, 329 N.W.2d 150, 153 (1983); see
also Harris v. Smith, 119 Ga. App. 306, 167 S.E.2d 198 (1969); RFSTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 308 (1965).
119. 96 N.J. 538, 476 A.2d 1219 (1984).
120. See id. at -, 476 A.2d at 1221.
121. Id. at _, 476 A.2d at 1224.
122. See, e.g., Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157, 470 A.2d 515 (1983).
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abled guests, 123 the Kelly court did not base liability on some
perceived legislative mandate. 12 4 Imposing social host liability
on the basis of common law, the Kelly court recognized the
inherent problems associated with justifying social host liabil-
ity on legislatively imposed standards of care arising out of
state dram shop acts or the theory of negligence per se. In the
absence of a direct legislative mandate for imposition of social
host liability, legislatures and courts have been reluctant to
hold the social host liable for serving alcohol to guests. Per-
haps the political repercussions of extending liability to social
hosts prevent the legislatures from authorizing the extension
of liability.125 The courts, however, are well equipped to im-
pose social host liability.
Extension of liability to social hosts is properly grounded
in common-law negligence as interpreted and applied by the
courts. The issue of social host liability is an issue of com-
mon-law negligence. Theories of negligence are properly de-
cided upon by the courts in the absence of direct legislative
preemption of the field.' 26 The requisite elements of a negli-
gence cause of action are present with respect to social host
liability. Furthermore, public policy factors warrant a finding
of social host liability.1 27 Finally, in Wisconsin, common-law
negligence principles provide a particularly persuasive frame-
work on which to base social host liability. 128
123. See, eg., Cantor v. Anderson, 126 Cal. App. 3d 124, 178 Cal. Rptr. 540
(1981).
124. "Perceived legislative mandate" refers to judicial perception of legislative rules
of law on civil liability in drunk driving cases.
125. Last session, a committee of the Wisconsin legislature drafted a state dram
shop act modeled after MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340.95 (West Supp. 1985). Assembly Bill
371, of the 1983-84 Legislature, would have given persons injured by an intoxicated
person the right to sue those who illegally sold, furnished, or gave away the alcoholic
beverages which caused the intoxication. The bill never left its original committee. In
fact, the author's name was withdrawn from the bill. Telephone interview with Richard
Rowe, Wisconsin Legislative Reference Bureau (Oct. 24, 1984). Withdrawal of the au-
thor's name from the bill indicated to Richard Rowe that dram shop legislation "must
not be popular in Wisconsin." Id.
126. Similarly, past deference to the legislature does not preclude adoption of a rule
of negligence law by the courts. Cf. Hansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis. 2d 550, 560,
335 N.W.2d 578, 582 (1983) (adopting the "discovery rule" in Wisconsin although the
legislature had recently refused to do so).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 104-20.
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Imposition of social host liability is a serious response to
one of the most compelling problems of modem times. The
gravity and frequency of injuries resulting from drunk driving
demonstrates the need for the fair application of negligence
law to extend liability to social hosts. Armed with the theo-
retical means to do so, the judiciary of this state has an obliga-
tion to deter drunk-driving accidents. Common sense
requires, if nothing else, that social hosts should be en-
couraged to deter their guests from driving while intoxicated.
Imposition of social host liability will encourage social hosts
to do their part in reducing the ubiquitous drunk driving
problem.
We are still our brothers keepers, and it would be a rare host
at a social gathering who would knowingly give more liquor
to an intoxicated friend when he knows his invitee must take
care of himself on the highway and may potentially endan-
ger other persons. Social justice and common sense require
the social host to see within reason that his guests do not
partake too much of his generosity. 29
DEBORAH B. GOLDBERG
129. Garcia v. Hargrove, 46 Wis. 2d 724, 740, 176 N.W.2d 566, 573-74 (1970)
(Hallows, C.J., dissenting).
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